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Abstract 
The Edge represents a fresh approach to organizational design. It appears to be particularly appropriate 
in the context of modern military warfare, but also raises issues regarding comparative performance of 
alternate organizational designs. Building upon prior C2 research, we seek to understand the comparative 
performance of the Edge and all organizational forms, across 21st Century and all mission-environmental 
conditions, and hence characterize the entire organization design space systematically. Leveraging 
recent advances in computational organization theory, we extend our campaign of experimentation to 
specify six, diverse, archetypal organizational forms from theory, and to evaluate their comparative 
performance empirically. Results confirm that no single organizational form is “best” for all circumstances; 
highlight contingent circumstances for which the Edge and other kinds of organizations perform relatively 
better than one another; and elucidate seven specific performance measures that provide 
multidimensional insight into different aspects of organizational performance. This research grounds the 
Edge organization firmly in well-established organization theory, and provides empirical support for and 
against claims regarding this novel organizational form, particularly in terms of agility. We discuss the 
model, experimental setup and results in considerable detail, which offer theoretical implications for the 
organization scholar and actionable guidance for the C2 practitioner. 
 
INTRODUCTION
The Edge (Alberts and Hayes 2003) represents a fresh approach to organizational design, which appears 
to be particularly appropriate in the context of modern military warfare. It proposes to capitalize upon fully 
connected, geographically distributed, organizational participants by enabling shared awareness, and by 
moving knowledge and power to the edges of organizations. This highlights promising opportunities for 
enterprise efficacy, but it also raises issues in terms of comparative performance with respect to alternate 
organizational designs. Modern military organizations in general have adapted and evolved over many 
centuries and millennia, respectively. Command and control (C2) through bureaucratic, hierarchical 
organizations in particular have been refined longitudinally (e.g., through iterative combat, training and 
doctrinal development) to become very reliable and effective at the missions they were designed to 
accomplish. In contrast, the many putative benefits and comparative advantages proposed for Edge 
organizations have since their origin remained untested hypotheses at best and naïve speculations at 
worst.  
The research described in this article addresses such putative benefits and comparative 
advantages directly, through a campaign of experimentation to assess the relative performance of Edge 
and other organizations across a diversity of mission-environmental contexts. This work builds directly 
upon prior C2 research that employs the methods and tools of computational experimentation to examine 
organizational performance empirically. For recent instance, Nissen and Buettner (2004) articulate the 
promise of computational experimentation toward this end, and elaborate a unique, complementary role 
that the associated research methods and tools can play in conjunction with other, more established 
methods (e.g., analytic modeling, laboratory experimentation, fieldwork). As another instance, Nissen 
(2005) compares and analyzes more than 25, diverse organizational forms from the organization studies 
literature, and shows how the Edge organization is theoretically distinct and uniquely differentiated from 
other organization forms described over the past half century. This prior research succeeded in grounding 
the Edge firmly in organization theory for the first time, which provides a noteworthy contribution to new 
knowledge. With this, organization scholars can now understand the theoretical characteristics of this new 
organizational form, and can make informed comparisons and contrasts with other, more familiar forms 
(esp. the Hierarchy). Also, C2 leaders and policy makers can now identify and understand the kinds of 
classic organizational forms that exhibit both similarities and differences with respect to the Edge. This 
prior research allows unprecedented, mutually informed conversations between organization scholars 
and C2 practitioners to take place now. 
Moreover, this prior research also offers a theoretical discussion, and develops a set of testable 
research hypotheses, about the performance of Edge and Hierarchy organization forms under two, 
contrasting, mission-environmental conditions: Industrial Era and 21st Century. Consistent with well-
established Contingency Theory (e.g., see Lawrence and Lorsch 1967 for seminal work, Donaldson 2001 
for contemporary review), this prior research demonstrates that no single organizational form—not even 
the Edge—is “best” for every mission-environmental context, and it elucidates the key mission-
environmental contingencies that impact the performance of these two, contrasting organizational forms. 
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With this, organization scholars can now assess the comparative performance of Edge organizations 
empirically, and can evaluate the Edge’s relative fit, across contrasting mission-environmental contexts, 
with respect to that of the Hierarchy. Also, C2 leaders and policy makers can now identify the kinds of 
mission-environmental conditions in which their predominant organizational form—the Hierarchy—is likely 
to suffer from performance degradation, and can appreciate the kinds of organizational changes required 
to become more edge-like. This offers a contribution to Organization Theory and C2 practice alike, and it 
provides a well-grounded baseline for our campaign of experimentation to understand—theoretically and 
empirically—the relative strengths and weaknesses of alternate organizational forms across different 
mission-environmental conditions. 
The present research continues this experimentation campaign, but expands it greatly to 
understand the comparative performance of all organizational forms, across all mission-environmental 
conditions. Through this campaign of experimentation, we are progressing systematically toward 
instantiation and analysis of the entire organization design space (i.e., in a contingency-theoretic sense) 
of organizational forms and mission-environmental contexts. Although such instantiation and analysis is 
clearly not exhaustive, by including a diversity of classic organizational archetypes from theory, and by 
examining them across contrasting and current mission-environmental contexts, this design space should 
be representative, and the results should be applicable across a wide diversity of organizations and 
environments in practice. This computational, organization studies research is theoretically grounded yet 
empirical in nature—thereby augmenting the largely atheoretic, speculative characterization of Edge 
organizations to date—and it targets theoretical development as well as practical application—thereby 
informing organization scholars and C2 practitioners alike. 
As reported in our prior research, however, few, if any, research methods—aside from 
computational experimentation—offer potential to even address this problem of organizational design 
space depiction and elaboration. Indeed, only through recent advances in computational organization 
theory (e.g., see Burton et al. 2002, Carley and Lin 1997, Levitt et al. 1999, Lomi & Larsen 2001) are we 
able to even consider the whole design space as such. For instance, to represent and reason about 
organizational processes, one can conduct computational experiments with levels of rigor and control 
comparable to laboratory experimentation. This can support greater internal validity and reliability than is 
obtainable often through fieldwork, and computational experiments can be conducted many orders of 
magnitude more quickly than physical experiments can. As another instance, computational experiments 
can be conducted to examine myriad different organizational designs—including cases that have yet to 
be implemented in physical organizations (Nissen 2005). This can support broad generalizability of 
results—even to classes of organizations that have yet to be invented, much less instantiated and 
experimented upon. As a third instance, mission-environmental contexts are not manipulated easily in the 
field, and laboratory experiments are limited generally to micro-level organizational phenomena, with 
problems in terms of external validity and generalizability. Computational experimentation can ameliorate 
such methodological difficulties. 
In the balance of this article, we present theoretical background and hypotheses, and then 
describe our computational model, present the results, and summarize important conclusions for 
organization theory and C2 practice. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND & HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we summarize briefly: Mintzberg’s (1979, 1980) classic, archetypal organization forms; the 
Edge organization; and the seven testable research hypotheses developed by Nissen (2005). For more 
detailed discussion, we encourage the interested reader to consult the references cited below. 
To begin, Mintzberg (1980) suggests a typology of five, archetypal organizational configurations: 
Simple Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, and Adhocracy. 
The different configurations vary according to the structuring and predominance of their organizational 
parts, coordination mechanisms, design parameters, and contingency factors. In Mintzberg’s own words 
(p. 322): 
 
In Simple Structure, the key part is the strategic apex, which coordinates by 
direct supervision; the structure is minimally elaborated and highly centralized; it 
is associated with simple, dynamic environments and strong leaders, and tends 
to be found in smaller, younger organizations or those facing severe crises. The 
 3
Machine Bureaucracy coordinates primarily by the imposition of work standards 
from the technostructure; jobs are highly specialized and formalized, units 
functional and very large (at the operating level), power centralized vertically at 
the strategic apex with limited horizontal decentralization to the technostructure; 
this structure tends to be found in simple, stable environments, and is often 
associated with older, larger organizations, sometimes externally controlled, and 
mass production technical systems. The Professional Bureaucracy relies on the 
standardization of skills in its operating core for coordination; jobs are highly 
specialized but minimally formalized, training is extensive and grouping is on a 
concurrent functional and market basis, with large sized operating units, and 
decentralization is extensive in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions; this 
structure is typically found in complex but stable environments, with technical 
systems that are simple and non-regulating. In the Divisionalized Form, a good 
deal of power is delegated to market-based units in the middle line (limited 
vertical decentralization), whose efforts are coordinated by the standardization of 
outputs, through the extensive use of performance control systems; such 
structures are typically found in very large, mature organizations, above all 
operating in diversified markets. Adhocracy coordinates primarily by mutual 
adjustment among all of its parts, calling especially for the collaboration of its 
support staff; jobs are specialized, involving extensive training but little 
formalization, units are small and combine functional and market bases in matrix 
structures, liaison devices are used extensively, and the structure is 
decentralized selectively in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions; these 
structures are found in complex, dynamic environments, and are often 
associated with highly sophisticated and automated technical systems. 
 
These five, archetypal organization forms from theory are broadly applicable, mutually distinct, and 
empirically confirmed. Hence they are broadly representative of current organizational conceptualizations 
and contemporary organizational practice, and many of the emerging organizational forms (e.g., strategic 
alliances, networked firms, Edge organizations) can be analyzed recombinantly through consideration of 
their separate parts, mechanisms, parameters and factors. 
Indeed, we show (see Nissen 2005) how the Edge organization shares similarities with the 
Adhocracy (e.g., coordination by mutual adjustment, small unit size, many liaison links throughout, 
selective decentralization), Professional Bureaucracy (e.g., low vertical specialization, high training and 
indoctrination, market and functional grouping), and Simple Structure (e.g., low horizontal specialization, 
low formalization), but it also demonstrates several key differences, and does not correspond cleanly with 
any single archetype. Key to Edge characterization is decentralization, empowerment, shared awareness 
and freely flowing knowledge required to push power for informed decision making and competent action 
to the “edges” of organizations (Alberts and Hayes 2003), where they interact directly with their 
environments and other players in the corresponding organizational field (Scott 2001). In contrast with the 
forms noted above, with which the Edge organization shares several similarities, the Edge shares almost 
no similarities with the Machine Bureaucracy (cf. high training and indoctrination). Indeed, as observed 
through our prior research with the Hierarchy, the Machine Bureaucracy form provides a contrast with the 
Edge, yet it maps cleanly to the Hierarchy. We refer to the Machine Bureaucracy and Hierarchy forms 
interchangeably. 
Finally, we revisit and recapitulate the key hypotheses developed through our prior research, 
which are rooted in current Edge “theory” (see esp. Alberts & Hayes 2003, but in addition: Garstka and 
Alberts 2004, Maxwell 2004, and Nissen 2004). This sets the stage for computational experimentation. 
The key Edge hypotheses are restated below for reference (see Nissen 2005 for derivation and 
discussion). 
 
Hypothesis 0. Edge organizations can outperform Hierarchy organizations in demanding mission 
environmental contexts. This represents the fundamental, null hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1. “Power to the Edge is the correct response to the increased uncertainty, volatility, 
and complexity associated with [21st century] military operations” [p. 6]. 
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Hypothesis 2. “The correct C2 approach depends on [five] factors”: 1) shift from static/trench to 
mobile/maneuver warfare; 2) shift from cyclic to continuous communications; 3) volume and 
quality of information; 4) professional competence; and 5) creativity and initiative [p. 19]. 
 
Hypothesis 3. “Given a robustly networked force, any one of the six effective command and 
control philosophies proven useful in the Industrial Era is possible” [p. 32]. 
 
Hypothesis 4. People who work together, over time, and learn to operate in a “post and smart-
pull” environment, will outperform similarly organized and capable people who do not. 
 
Hypothesis 5. “The more uncertain and dynamic an adversary and/or the environment are, the 
more valuable agility becomes” [p. 124]. 
 
Hypothesis 6. “An organization’s power can be increased without significant resource 
expenditures” [p. 172]. 
 
In addition, we draw two further hypotheses, based on the organizational ecologist perspective 
(e.g., see Nelson and Winter 1982). 
 
Hypothesis 7: Of all the organization forms, the Machine Bureaucracy will have experienced the 
greatest relative decline in performance over the past century. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Of all the organization forms, the Edge organization will have displayed the 
greatest relative increase in performance over the past century.  
 
These latter two hypotheses are also supported by Senge’s (1994) observation that the 21st Century 
requires more nimble, more adaptable organizations to match the ever-growing rates of technological 
change and complexity that characterize our modern era.  
COMPUTATIONAL MODELING BACKGROUND 
In this section we discuss computational organization theory briefly, and draw heavily from Nissen and 
Levitt (2004) to provide an overview of our computational modeling approach. We then describe the 
computational model developed to test our hypotheses. 
Computational Organization Theory Research 
Computational organization theory (COT) is an emerging, multidisciplinary field that integrates aspects of 
artificial intelligence, organization studies and system dynamics/simulation (e.g., see Carley and Prietula 
1994). Nearly all research in this developing field involves computational tools, which are employed to 
support computational experimentation and theorem proving through executable models developed to 
emulate the behaviors of physical organizations (e.g., see Burton et al. 2002, Carley and Lin 1997, Levitt 
et al. 1999).  
As the field has matured, several distinct classes of models have evolved for particular purposes, 
including: descriptive models, quasi-realistic models, normative models, and man-machine interaction 
models for training (Cohen and Cyert 1965, Burton and Obel 1995). More recent models have been used 
for purposes such as developing theory, testing theory and competing hypotheses, fine-tuning laboratory 
experiments and field studies, reconstructing historical events, extrapolating and analyzing past trends, 
exploring basic principles, and reasoning about organizational and social phenomena (Carley and Hill 
2001: 87).  
Our COT methods and tools build upon the planned accumulation of collaborative research over 
almost two decades to develop rich, theory-based models of organizational processes (Levitt 2004). 
Using an agent-based representation (Cohen 1992, Kunz et al. 1999), micro-level organizational 
behaviors have been researched and formalized to reflect well-accepted organization theory (Levitt et al. 
1999). Extensive empirical validation projects (e.g., Christiansen 1993, Thomsen 1998) have 
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demonstrated representational fidelity, and shown how the qualitative and quantitative behaviors of our 
computational models correspond closely with a diversity of enterprise processes in practice. 
This research stream continues today with the goal of developing new micro-organization theory, 
and embedding it in software tools that can be used to design organizations in the same way that 
engineers design bridges, semiconductors or airplanes—through computational modeling, analysis and 
evaluation of multiple, virtual prototypes. Clearly this represents a significant challenge. Micro-theory and 
analysis tools for designing bridges and airplanes rest on well-understood principles of physics (e.g., 
involving continuous numerical variables, describing materials whose properties are relatively easy to 
measure), and analysis of such physical systems yields easily differential equations and precise 
numerical computing. Of course, people, organizations and enterprise processes differ from bridges, 
airplanes and semiconductors, and it is irrational to expect the former to ever be as understandable, 
analyzable or predictable as the latter. This represents a fundamental limitation of the approach. 
Within the constraints of this limitation, however, we can still take great strides beyond relying 
upon informal and ambiguous, verbal, atheoretic descriptions of C2 organizational behavior. For instance, 
the domain of organization theory is imbued with a rich, time-tested collection of micro-theories that lend 
themselves to computational representation and analysis. Examples include Galbraith's (1977) 
information processing abstraction, March and Simon’s (1958) bounded rationality assumption, and 
Thompson’s (1967) task interdependence contingencies. Drawing on such theory, we employ symbolic 
(i.e., non-numeric) representation and reasoning techniques from established research on artificial 
intelligence to develop computational models of theoretical phenomena. Once formalized through a 
computational model, the symbolic representation is “executable,” meaning it can be used to emulate 
organizational dynamics. 
Even though the representation has qualitative elements (e.g., lacking the precision offered by 
numerical models), through commitment to computational modeling, it becomes semi-formal (e.g., most 
people viewing the model can agree on what it describes), reliable (e.g., the same sets of organizational 
conditions and environmental factors generate the same sets of behaviors) and explicit (e.g., much 
ambiguity inherent in natural language is obviated). Particularly when used in conjunction with the 
descriptive natural language theory of our extant literature, this represents a substantial advance.  
Additionally, although organizations are inherently less understandable, analyzable and 
predictable than physical systems are, and the behavior of people is non-deterministic and difficult to 
model at the individual level, it is known well that individual differences tend to average out when 
aggregated cross-sectionally or longitudinally. Thus, when modeling aggregations of people, such as 
work groups, departments and firms, one can augment the kind of symbolic model from above with 
certain aspects of numerical representation. For instance, the distribution of skill levels in an organization 
can be approximated—in aggregate—by a Bell Curve; the probability of a given task incurring exceptions 
and requiring rework can be specified—organization wide—by a distribution; and the irregular attention of 
a worker to any particular activity or event (e.g., new work task or communication) can be modeled—
stochastically—to approximate collective behavior. As another instance, specific organizational behaviors 
can be simulated hundreds of times—such as through Monte Carlo techniques—to gain insight into which 
results are common and expected versus those that are rare and exceptional. 
Of course, applying numerical simulation techniques to organizations is hardly new (Law and 
Kelton 1991). But this approach enables us to integrate the kinds of dynamic, qualitative behaviors 
emulated by symbolic models with quantitative metrics generated through discrete-event simulation. It is 
through such integration of qualitative and quantitative models—bolstered by reliance on sound theory 
and devotion to empirical validation—that our approach diverges most from extant research methods, and 
offers new insight into organizational dynamics. 
Computational Modeling Environment 
The computational modeling environment consists of the elements described in Table 1, and has been 
developed directly from Galbraith’s information processing view of organizations. This view of 
organizations, described in detail by Jin and Levitt (1996), has two key implications. The first is 
ontological: we model knowledge work through interactions of tasks to be performed; actors 
communicating with one another, and performing tasks; and an organization structure that defines actors’ 
roles, and constrains their behaviors. Figure 1 illustrates this view of tasks, actors and organization 
structure. As suggested by the figure, we model the organization structure as a network of reporting 
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relations, which can capture micro-behaviors such as managerial attention, span of control, and 
empowerment. We represent the task structure as a separate network of activities, which can capture 
organizational attributes such as expected duration, complexity and required skills. Within the 
organization structure, we further model various roles (e.g., marketing analyst, design engineer, 
manager), which can capture organizational attributes such as skills possessed, levels of experience, and 
task familiarity. Within the task structure, we further model various sequencing constraints, 
interdependencies, and quality/rework loops, which can capture considerable variety in terms of how 
knowledge work is organized and performed.  
 
Table 1 Model Elements and Descriptions 
Model
Element Element Description
Tasks Abstract representations of any work that consumes time, is required for project completion and can generate exceptions.
Actors A person or a group of persons who perform work and process information. 
Exceptions Simulated situations where an actor needs additional information, requires a decision from a supervisor, or discovers an error that needs correcting.
Milestones Points in a project where major business objectives are accomplished, but such markers neither represent tasks nor entail effort.
Successor 
links
Define an order in which tasks and milestones occur in a model, but they do not constrain 
these events to occur in a strict sequence. Tasks can also occur in parallel. Three types of 
successor links include: finish-start, start-start and finish-finish.
Rework 
links
Similar to successor links because they connect one task (called the driver  task) with 
another (called the dependent  task). However, rework links also indicate that the dependent 
task depends on the success of the driver task, and that the project's success is also in some 
way dependent on this. If the driver fails, some rework time is added to all dependent tasks 
linked to the driver task by rework links. The volume of rework is then associated with the 
project error probability settings.
Task 
assignments




Show which actors supervise which subordinates. The supervision structure (also called the 
exception-handling hierarchy ) represents a hierarchy of positions, defining who a 
subordinate would go to for information or to report an exception.
 
 
As suggested by the figure also, each actor within the intertwined organization and task 
structures has a queue of information tasks to be performed (e.g., assigned work activities, messages 
from other actors, meetings to attend) and a queue of information outputs (e.g., completed work products, 
communications to other actors, requests for assistance). Each actor processes such tasks according to 
how well the actor’s skill set matches those required for a given activity, the relative priority of the task, 
the actor’s work backlog (i.e., queue length), and how many interruptions divert the actor’s attention from 










Figure 1 Information Processing View of Knowledge Work 
 
The second implication is computational: work volume is modeled in terms of both direct work 
(e.g., planning, design, manufacturing) and indirect work (e.g., decision wait time, rework, coordination 
work). Measuring indirect work enables the quantitative assessment of (virtual) process performance 
(e.g., through schedule growth, cost growth, quality). 
Computational Model Validation 
The computational modeling environment has been validated extensively, over a period spanning almost 
two decades, by a team of more than 30 researchers (Levitt 2004). This validation process has involved 
three primary streams of effort: 1) internal validation against micro-social science research findings and 
against observed micro-behaviors in real-world organizations, 2) external validation against the 
predictions of macro-theory and against the observed macro-experience of real-world organizations, and 
3) model cross-docking experiments against the predictions of other computational models with the same 
input data sets (Levitt et al. 2005). Ours is one of the few, implemented, computational organization 
modeling environments that has been subjected to such a thorough, multi-method trajectory of validation. 
COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTATION & HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
In this section we formulate a computational model of the different organization forms. Then we develop a 
three-pronged set of experimental manipulations to test our hypotheses, and to examine the comparative 
performance of the different organizational forms under Industrial Era and 21st Century conditions. We 
discuss our contributions to theory and practice in turn. 
Model Set-Up: Organization Forms 
Table 2 shows how our COT modeling environment is used to formulate models of archetypal and Edge 
organizational forms, and how select model variables are used to operationalize the various organization 
design parameters. The three structural factors (i.e., organization, communication, work) derive directly 
from our prior computational experiments (Nissen 2005); the Mintzberg design parameters derive directly 
from Mintzberg (1980); and the model parameters derive directly from our computational models. These 
latter parameters are manipulated deliberately to represent each of the diverse organizational archetypes. 
Notice that each organizational archetype consists of a unique combination of parameter settings in our 
computational models.  
Parameter settings for the Edge and Machine Bureaucracy (i.e., equivalent to the Hierarchy in our 
prior article) replicate those reported by Nissen (2005), hence we concentrate here on extensions to the 
additional archetypal forms. For example, the Simple Structure is characterized by high centralization of 
decision making, low formalization of behavior, a two-level hierarchy, few liaison devices (which are 
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represented by a combination of relatively few communication links and a low setting (0.1) for the 
information exchange), a relatively small number of meetings (i.e. 2 hours per month), a low likelihood 
that actors will actually attend those meetings (which is represented by a low value on the matrix strength 
variable), and low levels of interdependence and concurrency between tasks.  
Notice how the Simple Structure exhibits both similarities and differences with respect to the 
Edge and Machine Bureaucracy forms. Our computational model enables specification of each, 
contrasting and unique, archetypal organization form in considerable detail. Parameter settings for the 
Professional Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form and Adhocracy follow accordingly. To preserve continuity 
for the non-modeler, the discussion here remains at a relatively high level. See Nissen (2005) for detailed 
definitions of the modeling concepts, terms and variables, for reference.  
 















Decentralization Centralization Low High High Low Medium Low
Formalization of
 behavior Formalization Low High Low Low High Low
Vertical 
specialization Hierarchy Set-Up 1-level 3-level 2-level 2-level 4-level 1-level
"    Holding Company (PM) 0 FTE 0 FTE 0 FTE 0 FTE 2 FTE 0 FTE
"    Command Position (PM) 0 FTE 3 FTE 5,000 FTE 7,000 FTE 4 FTE 0 FTE
"    Coordination Position (SL) 0 FTE 200 FTE 0 FTE 0 FTE 500 FTE 0 FTE
"    Operations Position (ST) 40,000 FTE 40,000 FTE 35,000 FTE 33,000 FTE 40,000 FTE 40,000 FTE
Size # of Total FTEs 40,000 40,203 40,000 40,000 40,006 40,000
Unit Size # of FTEs per Unit 100 - 1800 10,000 17,500 3700 9,875 100 - 1800
N/A # of Units 16 4 2 10 4 16
Training Skill Level1 Med. Med. Low Med Med. Low
Indoctrination App. Experience1 Med. Low Low High Med. Low
Liaison Devices Communication Links Many None Few Some Few Many
" Information Exchange1 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.9
Planning & Control 
Systems Meetings No Meetings 2 hrs/day 2 hrs/month 0.5 hr./day 2 hrs/week 0.5 hr./day
" Matrix Strength High Low Low Med. Low High
N/A2 Number of Operational Tasks 16 4 3 10 4 16









" Interdependence High Low Low Med Low High
"    Rework Links Many Few Few Some Few Many
"    Rework Strength 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
Environment -
 Complxity FEP/PEP 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
1 This is the baseline value for the Industrial Age case; the values are adjusted for the 21st Century case as specified in Table 4.









Model Set-Up: Industrial Era and 21st Century Conditions 
We model organizational contexts of the Industrial Era and the 21st Century via the three dimensions 
specified by Nissen (2005): mission and environmental context, network architecture, and professional 
competency. These dimensions capture our first six research hypotheses, and hence provide a principal 
basis for experimentation. Using our computational modeling tools, each manipulation can be conducted 
independently to isolate separate effects, or conducted collectively to emulate aggregate effects. The 
experimental manipulations are listed in Table 3, which summarize how each of the three experimental 
manipulations is specified across the two alternate scenarios. As noted at the bottom of in the table, we 
include a fourth, aggregate manipulation also. This aggregate manipulation includes all of the effects 
described in the other three manipulations: mission and environmental context, network architecture, and 
professional competency.  
The first manipulation is labeled “Mission & Environmental Context,” and derives principally from 
Hypotheses 1 and 5 above. This manipulation is intended to capture differences between mission-
environmental contexts of the Industrial Era and the 21st Century. Following Carroll and Burton (2000) in 
part, we depict this context as one of “medium complexity” for the Industrial Era scenario. Clearly 
complexity is relative. Even a “medium” complexity military operation would be considered “very complex” 
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with respect to most organizations in the world. But within our experimental design, we use the level 
medium here principally for contrast with the alternate, 21st Century scenario. We specify medium 
complexity via two model parameters: requirement complexity and solution complexity. The same holds 
for uncertainty, which we specify here as “medium” in like manner. Additionally, the Industrial Era 
scenario depicts a set of relatively routine and analyzable problems (Perrow 1967) to be solved. In the 
21st Century scenario, however, tasks are envisioned to be much more challenging. Hence we use 
higher levels for error parameters (i.e., FEP, PEP).  
 
Table 3 Model Set-Up: Industrial Era and 21st Century Conditions 
Manipulation Model Parameter Industrial Era Value
21st Century 
Value




FEP Baseline in Table 3
Baseline 
+ 0.1




Info. Exchange Prob. Baseline in Table 3
Baseline 
+ 0.3b
App. Experience Baseline in Table 3
Baseline in 
Table 3
Skill Level Baseline in Table 3
Baseline + one 
level
Team Experience Med High
All of the above All of the above All of the above
a 0.3 is the Baseline setting for this parameter.
b Except in the case of the Edge organization, for which the info exchange 













The second manipulation is labeled “Network Architecture,” and derives principally from 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. This manipulation is intended to capture information infrastructure differences 
between the centralized, vertical configurations in use today and the fully networked, global topologies 
being developed for tomorrow. Following Alberts and Hayes (2003), Garstka and Alberts (2004), and 
Maxwell (2004), as well as Carroll and Burton (2000) and Nogueira (2000), we characterize the current 
scenario  as one of a “stove piped” architecture, in which networks, processes and cultural norms support 
principally vertical communication within functional “silos” or “chimneys.” This current network architecture 
is characterized also in terms of “low bandwidth.” Again as above, bandwidth is relative. But many military 
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combatants in the air, at sea and on the ground have much poorer bandwidth than most land-based 
organizations do. Following Carroll and Burton (2000) in part, we specify this situation using noise, and 
include a relatively high level (0.3) in the Industrial Era Scenario. We use the parameter information 
exchange probability also, and specify the relatively low, Baseline level in the Industrial Era Scenario. The 
levels summarized in Table 3 for the 21st Century scenario reflect consistently a more robust and capable 
network architecture, which forms the predominate focus of most C2 leaders today, as they prepare for 
the 21st Century environment.  
The third manipulation is labeled “Professional Competency,” and derives principally from 
Hypotheses 2 and 4. This manipulation is intended to capture differences in organization and knowledge 
flows between the efficiency-oriented approaches practiced widely in the Industrial Era and the agility-
focused ones informed by emerging Knowledge-Flow Theory (e.g., see Nissen 2006) for the 21st Century. 
Professional competency pertains to the level of knowledge that people, groups and organizations 
possess with respect to their organizations, missions and environments. In the Industrial Era scenario, 
people, teams and organizations are able to develop extreme degrees of proficiency with the specific, 
limited set of missions and environments that they plan, generally well in advance, to encounter. 
Education and training are extensive, and the Military in particular has accumulated and documented vast 
amounts of doctrine to formalize organizational learning along these lines. This suggests a relatively 
higher level for the parameter application experience.  However, push, broadcast style information 
dissemination complicates the information-processing tasks associated with searching for important 
knowledge. This suggests a relatively lower level for application experience. On balance, we do not 
manipulate this parameter here, and leave it instead at “Low” as specified by Nissen (2005). Further, 
people change jobs frequently (e.g., every 2 – 3 years in the Military) in the Industrial Era. This makes it 
difficult for individuals to develop high skills specific to any particular job. We specify this effect through 
the relatively low, Baseline level for the parameter skill level. This frequent job rotation makes it difficult 
also for teams to develop long-term, cohesive bonds—which affect trust—and the kind of deep familiarity 
and understanding that comes only through tacit learning over extended periods of time. We specify this 
effect through medium level team experience.  
The levels summarized in Table 3 for the 21st Century scenario reflect a relative increase in team 
experience and skill level with respect to those specified for its Industrial Era counterpart. In particular, 
because the organization as a whole stresses agility over efficacy or efficiency (Alberts & Hayes 2003, p. 
180), it must prepare for a much wider variety of diverse missions and environments than its counterparts 
do. This offsets in part the kind of cumulative learning noted above and renders the organization in a 
situation requiring rapid learning on the margin for each, distinct mission. Departing somewhat from 
Nissen (2005), in which this effect is specified by adjusting the application experience level, we make no 
such adjustment here; our modeling environment lacks the range currently to manipulate this parameter 
as specified. We plan to readdress this application-experience effect in the next phase of computational 
experimentation. Conversely, agility calls for relatively small, experienced, cohesive units that can self-
organize into larger compositions of units, and that can self-synchronize their operations dynamically. Our 
interpretation of this is that less personnel rotation across units will become the norm (e.g., as it is in 
many knowledge organizations such as universities). We specify this effect by raising skill level and team 
experience.  
In design terms, this provides the basis for a full factorial, 6 x 4 x 2 experiment (i.e., 6 archetypes, 
4 manipulations, 2 scenarios), and our detailed specification of the models and manipulations should 
enable systematic experimentation and reliable replication by researchers. In this present article, we 
begin by examining the two, contrasting organizational forms specified through our prior research: Edge 
and Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy. Extending this prior research—which manipulated only Mission-
Environmental Context—here we examine these contrasting organizational forms across all four 
experimental manipulations. The other four organizational forms—Simple Structure, Professional 
Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, Adhocracy will be addressed in the next phase of experimentation. 
Hence this present article reports the results of a 2 x 4 x 2 factorial experiment. 
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Model Set-Up: Dependent Variables 
Table 4 details the dependent variables—time, cost, direct work, rework, coordination work, decision wait 
time, and project risk—that we use to assess the multidimensional performance of the different 
organization forms. 
 
Table 4 Dependent Variables and Description of Model Parameters 
Dependent  
Variable Parameter Description 
  
Time Time (days) is the predicted time to perform a project, in working days, which includes both direct and indirect (i.e. coordination, rework and decision latency) work. 
  
Cost Cost (dollars) is the predicted cost of labor to perform a project, in dollars, which includes both direct and indirect (i.e. coordination, rework and decision latency) work.  
  
Direct Work 
Direct work measures the amount of time, in person-days, that all actors in a project spend
completing direct functional or technical activities – excluding rework, coordination work, 
and decision wait time – related to the completion the project. 
  
Rework 
Rework measures the amount of time, in person-days, that all actors in a project spend 




Coordination work measures the amount of time, in person-days, that all actors in a project 




Decision wait time measures the amount of time, in person-days, that all actors in a project 




Project risk index (PRI) measures the risk to quality arising from project exceptions. PRI 
represents the likelihood that all of the planned work components will not be integrated 
well by project completion, or that the integration will have residual defects based on 
incomplete rework and exception handling. Numerically, PRI is calculated as the fraction of 
effort needed to process ignored and quick-fixed project exceptions normalized by the total 





In this section, we describe the experimental results produced using the computational models 
and (6 x 4 x 2) experimental design outlined above. Specifically, here we evaluate emulated 
organizational performance for Edge and Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy organizations, across four 
experimental manipulations, under both Industrial Era and 21st Century conditions. Results are 
summarized in Table 5 in terms of the seven-variable, multidimensional array of performance measures 
summarized above. For each of the organizational forms shown in Table 5, the first column includes the 
seven measures that summarize and report performance under the Industrial Era conditions. The data in 
this column can be considered as a baseline for comparison with the 21st Century Conditions. For 
instance, in the case of the Industrial Era Edge scenario, simulated time and cost are 223 days and 
$894M, respectively. Corresponding 21st Century values are 234 days and $970M, representing 
respective increases of 5% and 9%. 
 













Time (days) 223 234 5% 229 313 37%
Cost ($M) 894 970 9% 1165 1621 39%
Direct Work (k-days) 819 819 0% 830 830 0%
Rework (k-days) 113 166 47% 135 429 218%
Coordination (k-days) 186 227 22% 15 39 160%
Decision Wait (k-days) 0 0 0% 62 189 205%
PRI 0.77 0.77 0% 0.37 0.36 -3%
Time (days) 223 223 0% 229 229 0%
Cost ($M) 894 893 0% 1165 1159 -1%
Direct Work (k-days) 819 819 0% 830 830 0%
Rework (k-days) 113 113 0% 135 135 0%
Coordination (k-days) 186 184 -1% 15 11 -27%
Decision Wait (k-days) 0 0 0% 62 60 -3%
PRI 0.77 0.77 0% 0.37 0.36 -3%
Time (days) 223 149 -33% 229 172 -25%
Cost ($M) 894 611 -32% 1165 871 -25%
Direct Work (k-days) 819 819 0% 830 830 0%
Rework (k-days) 113 81 -28% 135 100 -26%
Coordination (k-days) 186 163 -12% 15 11 -27%
Decision Wait (k-days) 0 0 0% 62 44 -29%
PRI 0.77 0.77 0% 0.37 0.37 0%
Time (days) 223 159 -29% 229 224 -2%
Cost ($M) 894 685 -23% 1165 1152 -1%
Direct Work (k-days) 819 819 0% 830 830 0%
Rework (k-days) 113 145 28% 135 315 133%
Coordination (k-days) 186 214 15% 15 26 73%
Decision Wait (k-days) 0 0 0% 62 143 131%















In the following subsections, we first make some comparisons across the two organizational forms, 
providing empirical data for comparison across theoretically distinct forms. We then discuss the relative 
change in performance of each form observed across the Industrial and 21st Century Eras. In turn we 
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make comparisons across the four experimental manipulations, examining each experimental condition 
affects the behavior and performance of these, contrasting organizational archetypes, across the two 
eras. We close by summarizing the empirical results in terms of our research hypotheses. 
 
Comparisons across Organizational Forms 
The first set of observations pertains to performance of the two, contrasting organizational forms. For this 
we concentrate on the first manipulation row in the table (i.e., the Mission-Environmental Context) and the 
Industrial Era case. This represents the Baseline set of conditions for both the Edge and 
Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy organizational forms; that is, we control for the mission-environmental 
context, setting it at levels appropriate for the familiar Industrial Era, and vary the organizational form. 
This provides us with a relatively clean view of how organizational form affects performance in this 
context, and it enables us to compare these empirical results with theoretical predictions. These results 
match those reported in Nissen (2005)—albeit varying insignificantly in a few places due to rounding.  
 First, notice that the time required for mission performance is comparable: 223 days for the Edge 
and 229 for the Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy. However, the Edge mission cost ($894M) is roughly 
25% less than that of the Hierarchy. This is due in large part to the additional overhead associated with 
the Machine Bureaucracy organization. Direct work represents the accomplishment of planned mission 
tasks, and is comparable across the two organizations. The Edge level (819K person-days) is a bit lower 
than that of the Hierarchy because the latter organization includes explicit Command and Coordination 
work (see Table 2). This corresponds in part to the additional overhead noted above. Rework measures 
the amount of mission work that is redone. The values reported in the table indicate that the Edge 
organization (113K person-days) engages in somewhat less rework than the Hierarchy (135K) does. In 
contrast, the Edge engages in an order of magnitude greater coordination work (186K person-days) than 
the Hierarchy (15K) does. This reflects directly the flat organization and highly networked, peer-to-peer 
communication structures associated with the Edge. In further contrast, the Edge organization incurs no 
decision wait time, whereas the Hierarchy reveals a sizeable amount (62K person-days). Unlike the 
Hierarchy, in which actors wait for supervisors to make decisions and to provide information, Edge actors 
make the best decisions that they can, and use the best information that they have, when called to 
perform their mission tasks. This accounts in part for the slightly faster mission-execution time. Finally, 
PRI is a mission-risk index, which quantifies the magnitude of work that would be required to correct all 
exceptions that were not reworked completely. The Edge (0.77) exhibits double the risk associated with 
mission performance by the Machine Bureaucracy (0.37).  
In summary, looking across this multidimensional characterization of comparative organizational 
performance, neither organizational form is clearly dominant in the Industrial Era mission-environmental 
context. The Edge form is slightly faster and considerably less expensive than the Machine Bureaucracy 
is, plus it engages in less rework than the Hierarchy does, and incurs no decision wait time. Alternatively, 
the Edge exhibits an order of magnitude greater coordination cost and double the mission risk associated 
with the Hierarchy. Which one is “better” depends upon stakeholder performance preferences. 
 
Comparisons across Eras 
The second set of observations pertains to performance of the organizations across the Industrial and 
21st Century Eras. For this we continue to concentrate on the first manipulation row in the table, but here 
we look across the two eras. Looking first at the Edge organization, notice that performance is worse 
across nearly every dimension. For instance, time (234 vs. 223), cost ($970M vs. $894M), rework (166 vs. 
113), and coordination work (227 vs. 186) are all higher in the 21st Century Era than in the Industrial Era. 
Alternatively, direct work, decision wait, and risk are all unchanged for the Edge organization across eras. 
As predicted theoretically, the 21st Century mission-environmental context is more challenging and 
demanding than the Industrial Era is.  
The same applies generally to the Machine Bureaucracy, but notice that performance differences 
across the two eras are more extreme here than reflected for the Edge organization. For instance, 
whereas mission time and cost extend only slightly (5%, 9%, respectively) for the Edge form, the 
increases for the Hierarchy are much larger (37%, 39%). Performance degradation for the Hierarchy 
across eras is even more extreme in terms of rework (218%), coordination (160%) and decision wait time 
(205%). The Machine Bureaucracy organization clearly struggles to perform in the 21st Century mission-
environmental context, and hence makes the Edge form appear to be far more robust to mission-
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environmental change. This provides empirical support for the Edge form exhibiting greater agility than 
the Hierarchy does.  
 
Comparisons across Experimental Manipulations 
The third set of observations pertains to performance of the organizations across the four experimental 
manipulations. For this we look down the columns of the table, and we concentrate on the 21st Century 
Era, since this represents more of the present and future than the past. Looking first at the Edge 
organization, we compare its 21st Century performance reported above in the Mission & Environmental 
Context row with that summarized in the Network Architecture row of the table. Notice that organizational 
performance improves across most dimensions through this network manipulation. Indeed, all of the Edge 
performance values for the Network Architecture manipulation in the 21st Century Era are very close to 
their baseline values in the Industrial Era. This provides a striking contrast to results from above, in which 
the organization performs consistently worse in the 21st Century Era than in the Industrial Era. In 
essence, the network-architecture effects serve to cancel out impacts of moving to the more challenging 
and demanding 21st Century Era. For instance, whereas Edge performance in the 21st Century Era would 
degrade (e.g., to 234 days in terms of time, $970M in terms of cost) without the improved network 
architecture, with such architecture effects, the Edge organization becomes highly robust to the 
associated challenges and demands (e.g., 223 days, $893M). Although the network architecture 
manipulation does not improve Edge performance, it enables the organization to sustain its performance 
level even in the face of a more challenging and demanding environment. This provides empirical support 
for the network architecture effects enabling greater agility than the current, vertical architecture does. 
 These effects are even more pronounced for the Machine Bureaucracy than for the Edge 
organization. As above, the improved network architecture insulates the Hierarchy organization from the 
challenges and demands of the 21st Century environment, but recall from above how this latter 
organizational form struggles with the 21st Century. For instance, whereas Machine Bureaucracy 
performance in the 21st Century Era would degrade (e.g., to 313 days in terms of time, $1621M in terms 
of cost) without the improved network architecture, with such architecture effects, the Hierarchy 
organization becomes highly robust to the associated challenges and demands (e.g., 229 days, $1159M). 
Also as above, although the network architecture manipulation does not improve Machine Bureaucracy 
performance, it enables the organization to sustain its performance level even in the face of a more 
challenging and demanding environment. This provides empirical support for the network architecture 
effects enabling greater agility than the current, vertical architecture does, particularly for an inherently 
less agile organizational form. Here we find an insightful substitution effect: network-architecture 
improvements to the Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy can produce similar results in terms of agility as 
those associated with adopting the Edge organizational form. Hence a change in organizational form can 
be substituted to some degree for a change in network architecture, and vice versa. This represents a 
noteworthy, empirical result, both in terms of organization theory and C2 practice. 
 Looking again at the Edge organization, here we compare its 21st Century performance reported 
above in the Mission & Environmental Context row with that summarized for the Professional 
Competency manipulation. Notice that organizational performance improves dramatically across multiple 
dimensions through this manipulation. For instance, 21st Century Era Edge performance for the 
Professional Competency manipulation improves by one third to one half in terms of time (36%), cost 
(37%) and rework (51%). This quantifies the huge importance of organization and knowledge flows in 
terms of performance. Notice also that 21st Century Era Edge performance for the Professional 
Competency manipulation is better than baseline Edge performance in the Industrial Era. Even stronger 
than the insulating effect described above in terms of the Network Architecture manipulation—through 
which performance does not degrade in the more challenging and demanding 21st Century Era—
improving professional competency makes the Edge organization even better in the 21st Century Era than 
in the Industrial Era. This provides empirical support for the professional competency effects enabling 
much, much greater agility—and much better organizational performance—than the current, efficiency-
oriented approach to organization and knowledge flows does. 
 Also as above in the Network Architecture manipulation, these effects are even more pronounced 
for the Machine Bureaucracy than for the Edge organization. The improved professional competency 
enables even more dramatic performance improvements (e.g., 45% in terms of time, 46% in terms of 
cost, 77% in terms of rework, 72% in terms of coordination, 77% in terms of decision wait time) for the 
Hierarchy organization than for the Edge. Also as above, the professional competency manipulation 
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enables the organization to improve its performance level even in the face of a more challenging and 
demanding environment. This provides empirical support for the professional competency effects 
enabling greater agility than the current, efficiency-oriented approach does, particularly for an inherently 
less agile organizational form. Here we find an insightful hyper-substitution effect: professional 
competency improvements to the Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy can produce even more dramatic 
results in terms of agility as those associated with adopting the Edge organizational form. Hence a 
change in professional competency can be substituted to a large degree for a change in organizational 
form. Unlike the substitution effects noted above for the network architecture manipulation, however, the 
converse does not hold for professional competency: changing organizational form does not compensate 
for a reversion to an efficiency-oriented organization and knowledge-flow approach. This represents 
another noteworthy, empirical result, both in terms of organization theory and C2 practice. 
 Finally, we look at the fourth, aggregate manipulation, which combines all the effects of all three 
manipulations discussed above. Because the professional competency manipulation exerts the greatest 
effects on organizational performance—for the Edge and Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy alike—this 
aggregate manipulation reflects the values of its professional competency counterpart closely. However, 
the results exhibit some interaction effects between the three manipulations, in which combining all three 
manipulations together actually degrades performance a bit when compared with only the professional 
competency effects, for instance. This signals that the organizational scholar needs to conduct additional 
research to understand such interaction effects better, and that the C2 practitioner needs to be judicious 
about combining effects. Nonetheless, when all manipulations are combined, both the Edge organization 
and its Hierarchy counterpart perform considerably better in the 21st Century Era than in the Industrial 
Era, and both become much more agile and robust to the challenges and demands of the 21st Century 
Era. Hence one can argue that C2 leaders and policy makers should pursue the kinds of manipulations in 
practice that we examine through our computational experimentation here. 
 
Support for Research Hypotheses 
The final set of observations pertains to support for the research hypotheses developed by Nissen (2005) 
and summarized above. We repeat these hypotheses here for reference, and address each in turn. 
 
Hypothesis 0. Edge organizations can outperform Hierarchy organizations in demanding mission 
environmental contexts. This, null hypothesis demands an omnibus assessment of Edge and 
Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy organizational performance across eras. As noted above, the Edge 
organization outperforms the Hierarchy in the 21st Century Era, and its agility enables it to be more robust 
to demanding mission-environmental changes. This provides good support for the hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1. “Power to the Edge is the correct response to the increased uncertainty, volatility, and 
complexity associated with [21st century] military operations” [p. 6]. As noted above, our Mission & 
Environmental Context manipulation addresses this hypothesis in part, and results above in terms of 
comparisons across eras provides considerable support for this hypothesis. The Edge organization 
exhibits considerably greater agility, and hence is more robust to the challenges and demands of the 21st 
Century Era than the Hierarchy is. 
 
Hypothesis 2. “The correct C2 approach depends on [five] factors”: 1) shift from static/trench to 
mobile/maneuver warfare; 2) shift from cyclic to continuous communications; 3) volume and quality of 
information; 4) professional competence; and 5) creativity and initiative [p. 19]. As noted above, our 
Network Architecture manipulation addresses this hypothesis in part, and the Professional Competency 
manipulation addresses it too. If we look to the Aggregate manipulation above, we see that improving the 
network architecture and enhancing professional competency improves organizational performance 
considerably, for the Edge and Hierarchy alike. Hence this hypothesis is supported for multiple (i.e., at 
least two) organizational forms. 
 
Hypothesis 3. “Given a robustly networked force, any one of the six effective command and control 
philosophies proven useful in the Industrial Era is possible” [p. 32]. As noted above, our Network 
Architecture manipulation addresses this hypothesis in part, as we find evidence that improving network 
architecture increases organizational agility, and makes the organization more robust to challenges and 
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demands of the 21st Century Era. However, our computational models do not represent each of six 
different C2 philosophies explicitly; hence our support for this hypothesis is limited. 
 
Hypothesis 4. People who work together, over time, and learn to operate in a “post and smart-pull” 
environment, will outperform similarly organized and capable people who do not. As noted above, our 
Professional Competency manipulation addresses this hypothesis in large part, but the Network 
Architecture manipulation plays some role too (e.g., post and smart-pull environment). If we focus on 
professional competency effects, which include people working together over time, we find substantial 
support for this hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 5. “The more uncertain and dynamic an adversary and/or the environment are, the more 
valuable agility becomes” [p. 124]. As noted above also, our Mission & Environmental Context 
manipulation addresses this hypothesis in part, and results above in terms of comparisons across eras 
provide considerable support for this hypothesis. The Edge organization exhibits considerably greater 
agility, and hence is more robust to the uncertainties and dynamics of the 21st Century Era than the 
Hierarchy is. 
 
Hypothesis 6. “An organization’s power can be increased without significant resource 
expenditures” [p. 172]. This hypothesis is difficulty to assess via our computational results, for we do not 
represent resource expenditures explicitly, nor do we have variables to measure power. Indeed, the kinds 
of network architecture effects represented in our model demand huge resource investments in global 
communications infrastructure. Such investments provide some evidence against this hypothesis. 
Alternatively, the kinds of professional competency effects represented in our model do not demand large 
resource investments, as simply changing organizational policy to reduce job and personnel turnover can 
bring about considerable improvements in knowledge flows—and in turn organizational performance. 
 
In addition, we draw two further hypotheses, based on the organizational ecologist perspective 
(e.g., see Nelson and Winter 1982). 
 
Hypothesis 7: Of all the organization forms, the Machine Bureaucracy will have experienced the greatest 
relative decline in performance over the past century. This hypothesis is designed to examine a multitude 
of diverse organizational forms, not just the two examined here, so assessing the level of support for it will 
have to wait until we have examined all six of the forms discussed above through our campaign of 
computational experimentation. In terms of just the Edge and Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy forms, 
however, our results provide some support for this hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Of all the organization forms, the Edge organization will have displayed the greatest 
relative increase in performance over the past century. The rationale and explanation presented to 
address Hypothesis 7 above applies to Hypothesis 8 also. 
CONCLUSION 
The Edge represents a fresh approach to organizational design. It appears to be particularly appropriate 
in the context of modern military warfare, but also raises issues regarding comparative performance of 
alternate organizational designs. Building upon prior C2 research, we seek to understand the comparative 
performance of the Edge and all organizational forms, across 21st Century and all mission-environmental 
conditions, and hence characterize the entire organization design space systematically. Leveraging 
recent advances in computational organization theory, we extend our campaign of experimentation to 
specify six, diverse, archetypal organizational forms from theory, and to evaluate their comparative 
performance empirically.  
Results confirm the contingency-theoretic maxim that no single organizational form is “best” for all 
circumstances. However, they also highlight the kinds of contingent circumstances for which the Edge 
and other kinds of organizations perform relatively better than one another, and they elucidate seven 
specific performance measures that provide multidimensional insight into different aspects of 
organizational performance. Indeed, we find that the Edge outperforms the Hierarchy/Machine 
Bureaucracy in terms of some measures, but is outperformed in terms of others. Alternatively, as 
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predicted, our empirical results reveal that the Edge form exhibits considerable agility, capable of resisting 
performance degradation—and with some improvements such as in professional competency to achieve 
performance enhancement—even when encountering the challenging and demanding mission-
environmental context associated with the 21st Century Era. 
This research makes a contribution by grounding the Edge organization firmly in well-established 
organization theory, providing theoretical characterization of the Edge for the first time, and enabling 
organization scholars and C2 practitioners to engage in mutually informed discussion. This research also 
makes a contribution by providing empirical support both for and against claims regarding this novel 
organizational form, elaborating dynamic behaviors and performance impacts of the Edge. Of particular 
theoretical and practical interest are the substitution and hyper-substitution effects demonstrated across 
experimental manipulations. Toward the former, we find that organization form and network architecture 
improvements are substitutable for one another in terms of making the organization robust to mission-
environmental changes. This offers theoretical insight into substitution effects, and it provides practical 
guidance for the C2 leader and policy maker interested in organizational design and change. Toward the 
latter, we find that professional competency improvements are hyper-substitutable in terms of 
organizational form and network architecture in this regard, enhancing performance even through 
mission-environmental changes. This offers theoretical insight and practical guidance also. 
 In terms of practical guidance, the C2 leader and policy maker should pursue improvements in 
network architecture to the extent that resources permit, for this improves organizational agility, but he or 
she should also pursue organizational change toward the Edge form, particularly where the challenges 
and demands of the current mission-environmental context diverge substantially from those faced during 
the Industrial Era. Likewise, the C2 leader and practitioner should pursue improvements in professional 
competency also, with an added bonus of being able to effect such improvements without large resource 
investments. Indeed, results suggest that organizational change as simple as reducing job and personnel 
turnover may produce stunning performance gains. However, the leader and policy maker should be 
judicious about pursuing all of the organizational changes examined in this study at the same time. The 
various experimental manipulations reveal interactions that are not immediately clear, but which combine 
to impact organizational performance negatively. More research into such interactions is warranted. 
 In terms of continued research, we have established solid and well-articulated computational 
models of the Edge and Hierarchy/Machine Bureaucracy organizations, which other researchers can use 
to continue this campaign of experimentation. Indeed, we propose that all C2 researchers compare the 
structure and behavior of their computational models to these, using our models as standards for 
analysis. This can provide the C2 Research Community with known and understood baselines for 
comparison. Additionally, we have conducted multiple experiments on these organizations, across four 
experimental manipulations, and across two mission-environmental contexts and historical eras. This 
provides a foundation on which other researchers can build to test other manipulations of theoretical and 
practical interest. Further, we have specified four additional, classic, archetypal organizational forms from 
the literature, which need to be tested along side of the forms examined in this present study. This 
represents the primary focus of our next set of computational experiments, as we continue the cumulative 
accretion of new knowledge through research. If we are successful, and elaborate the entire 
organizational design space via computational experimentation, we will produce the first, comprehensive 
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Appendix I – Model Parameter Definitions 
In this appendix, we both paraphrase and quote from [SV online help] to include definitions of the 
model elements and parameters that are discussed above and applicable to the computational 
experimentation reported in this study. 
 
Activity - See Task. 
 
Actor - See Position. 
 
Application experience - A measure of how familiar the position or person is with similar projects. 
 
Behavior file - A file that specifies the simulator's default behavior, such as how much rework to 
add to tasks with exceptions. 
 
Centralization - A measure of how centralized the decision - making is in a project. For example, 
high centralization indicates that most decisions are made and exceptions handled by top 
managerial positions such as the Project Manager. Low centralization means decisions are made 
by individual responsible positions. 
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Communication - The passing of information between positions about tasks. 
 
Communications link - A dashed green link that links two tasks, indicating that the position 
responsible for the first task must communicate with the other position during or at the completion 
of the first task. 
 
Coordination - A combination of the information exchange generated by communication and 
meetings. 
 
Coordination Volume - The predicted time during a project or program that all positions spend at 
meetings and processing information requests from other positions. 
 
Critical path - The set of tasks in a project that determine the total project duration. Lengthening 
any of the tasks on the critical path lengthens the project duration. 
 
Decision wait time - The time a position waits for a response from the supervisor about how to 
handle an exception, plus any time the position waits for exception resolution before making the 
decision by default. See also Wait Volume. 
 
Exception - A situation detected by the simulator where part of a task requires additional 
information or a decision, or generates an error that may need correcting. 
 
Exception handling - Involves positions reporting exceptions to supervisors and supervisors 
making decisions on how to deal with the exceptions. 
 
Failure dependency link - See Rework link. 
 
Formalization - A measure of the formality of communication in an organization. For example, 
high formalization indicates that most communication occurs in formal meetings. 
 
FRI (Functional Risk Index) - A measure of the likelihood that components produced by a project have 
defects. Also called CQI, or Component Quality Index. 
 
Full - time equivalent (FTE) - A measure of position or person availability to perform a task. For 
example, a position with an FTE value of 3 has the equivalent of 3 full - time employees to perform tasks. 
 
Functional exception - An error that causes rework in a task but does not affect any dependent 
tasks. 
 
Links - A set of color - coded arrows that represent the relationships between shapes. 
 
Matrix Strength - A measure of the level of supervision in a project or program, and a reflection of the 
structure of the organization. Low matrix strength means that positions are located in skillbased functional 
departments and supervised directly by functional managers. High matrix 
strength means positions are co-located with other skill specialists in dedicated project teams and 
have project supervision from a Project Manager. 
 
Meeting - A gathering of positions to communicate about the project and project tasks. 
 
Meeting Participant link - A dashed grey line that links a position to a meeting, indicating that the 
position must attend the meeting. 
 
Milestone - A point in a project or program where a major business objective is completed. 
 
Model - A visual representation of a program and its projects. 
 21
 
Noise - The probability that a position is distracted from assigned tasks. 
 
Organization - A group of departments that staff a program or project. 
 
Organization Assignment link - A solid pink line that links an organization to a project within a 
program. 
 
PM - Project Manager, the position that assumes overall responsibility for a project. 
 
Position - An abstract group representing one or more FTEs (full - time equivalents) that performs work 
and processes information. In a staffed project, positions represent a person or a group of persons. 
 
PRI (Project Risk Index) - A measure of the likelihood that components produced by a project will not be 
integrated at the end of the project, or that the integration will have defects. PRI is thus a measure of the 
success of system integration. 
 
Primary Assignment link - A solid blue line that links a position to a primary task, which is a task 
that takes priority over any secondary assignments. 
 
Program - A set of related projects that share dependencies and together achieve the client's 
business objectives. A program also includes the associated responsible organizations, 
milestones, and relationships between projects. 
 
Project - A project represents work an organization must perform to achieve a major business 
milestone. The work is represented by tasks, milestones, the positions that perform tasks, 
meetings, and the dependencies between all these elements. While a model may contain 
numerous projects, it need only contain one. Each project in a model supports the goal of the 
program to which the project belongs. 
 
Project exceptions - Errors that might cause rework in a driver task and all its dependent tasks. 
 
Project Exception Rate - The probability that a subtask will fail and generate rework for failure 
dependent tasks. This probability is generally in the range 0.01 (low) to 0.10 (significant, but 
common). If the Project Exception Rate is greater than about 0.20, so much rework can be 
generated that the project may never finish. 
 
Project Successor link - A solid black line that links a project to another project or to a project 
milestone. 
 
Rework - Redoing all or part of a task. Compare with direct work. 
 
Rework Cost - The predicted cost of rework, or rework volume weighted by average cost per FTE of 
positions that do rework. 
 
Rework link - A dashed red line that links a task to a dependent task that will need rework if the 
driver task fails. 
 
Rework Volume - The predicted time needed for all positions on a project to do the required 
rework. 
 
Scenario - See Case. 
 
Secondary Assignment link - A dashed blue line that links a position to a secondary task, which 
is a task that can be worked whenever the position is not working on a primary task. 
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Simulator - Software that simulates the work done by positions as they perform individual project 
tasks, including both planned direct work and coordination and rework. 
 
Simulation charts - Charts that summarize and provide details of the simulated performance of 
the program and the individual modeled projects. 
 
Successor link - A solid black line that links milestones and tasks. 
 
Supervision link - A solid black line that links a supervisory position to its supervised position. 
 
Task - Any work that consumes time, can generate communications or exceptions, and is required for 
project completion. 
 
VFP (Verification Failure Probability) - The probability that an exception will be generated for a 
task. The VFP is calculated during simulation based on a number of factors, including noise, 
communication rates, and team experience. 
 
Wait Volume - A measure of the cumulative time spent by positions waiting for decisions to be 
made in a project. 
 
Work volume - The predicted time that all positions on a project spend doing direct work. 
 
 
 
 23
